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Preface 
 
 
SEC 1999/05 is a contract for fisheries research awarded to Lincoln University in 1999.  The 
research concerns the identification of instrument to internalise the externalities associated 
with commercial fisheries in New Zealand.  There are three objectives for the research.  
Hughey et al (2000) report on objective 1, i.e., identification of instruments; this report is 
designed to meet the requirements of objective 2, i.e., development of criteria to evaluate the 
effectiveness from implementing these instruments; and Kerr et al (2000) report on objective 
3, i.e., development of a draft ‘Decision Support System’ to implement this approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ross Cullen 
DIRECTOR 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
New Zealand has the world’s fourth largest Exclusive Economic Zone and a very large 
commercial fishery.  Arguably this fishery is one of the best managed in the world.  
Nevertheless, many problems remain to be solved, especially environmental problems.  Many 
of these problems can be categorised as externalities from commercial fishing.  We (Hughey 
et al. 2000) have identified a wide range of policy instruments which can be applied to the 
internalisation of these externalities.  In this report we: 
 
• identify criteria against which each of these instruments should be evaluated before it is 
considered for implementation.  The criteria are environmental, Treaty of Waitangi, 
socio-economic, recreational and management, respectively; 
• Evaluate the effectiveness of chosen instruments against these criteria. 
  
All of these tools can be used to enhance decision making in fisheries management and a 
framework for this decision making is proposed. 
 10
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
The stated overall objective of the MFish research project, SEC 1999/05 is: 
 
“to determine methods or processes to internalise the environmental externalities 
of fishing that will allow fisheries managers to address the obligations in the 
Fisheries Act 1996 to avoid, remedy or mitigate the adverse effects on the 
aquatic environment”. 
 
With respect to objective 1, “To review the economic, environmental, and resource 
management literature, including case studies relating to internalising environmental 
externalities, having regard to a full range of regulatory, economic, social, institutional, and 
behavioural policy instruments”, we concluded that a range of negative environmental effects 
are associated with commercial fishing activities in many New Zealand fisheries (Hughey et 
al. 2000).  We developed an Environmental Impact Assessment framework for fisheries 
management in New Zealand and determined that where some impacts are significant, others 
are not.  Many efforts have been made to reduce significant adverse effects by means of a 
variety of policy instruments.   
 
We also examined a wide range of regulatory, economic, social, institutional and behavioural 
policy instruments covering resources other than fisheries.  Some, but not all, of these 
instruments are already employed in NZ fisheries, to greater or lesser extents, either explicitly 
(e.g., regulation), or implicitly (e.g., modifying behavioural expectations).  New mechanisms 
of potential value to fisheries management have been identified.  
 
The aim of this report, specifically in relation to objective 2, is, “from the results of Objective 
1, to determine appropriate criteria to facilitate the evaluation of alternative internalisation 
mechanisms”.  As part of the process of preparing this report we have consulted with a 
variety of interest groups about the instruments and about the criteria for evaluation.  The 
organisations consulted were: 
 
Talleys, Nelson 
Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society, Wellington 
ECO, Wellington 
SeaRight Investments Ltd, Christchurch 
Te Runanga O Ngai Tahu, Christchurch. 
 
Many useful suggestions were made in these discussions and at a subsequent meeting of the 
MFish Socio-Economic Research Group and these have been incorporated into development 
of this report. 
 12
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Chapter 2 
A Framework for Decision-Making 
 
 
Selection of the most appropriate response to managing environmental externalities in 
fisheries entails a process that may be split into a number of sequential decision-making 
stages. The nature of those stages and the processes adopted within them are potentially quite 
diverse. The approach adopted here is termed mixed scanning (Mitchell, 1997). The mixed 
scanning approach uses a mixture of processes to identify desirable changes. This approach 
does not attempt to obtain complete information on, or even to identify, all possible 
alternatives, but still allows for the possibility of fundamental change by scrutinising a 
limited number of options that are significantly different from the status quo. 
 
Each option for addressing environmental externalities has two component parts, the action 
and the policy instrument/mechanism. Actions are behaviours undertaken in the context of 
fishing. They may include aspects such as: the gear used, how gear is deployed, when fishing 
occurs (time of day, or time of year), how long fishing occurs for, the amount of effort 
applied to fishing, the number, quality and type of fish either discarded or landed, fishing 
location. There are a number of policy mechanisms that may bring these actions about, either 
voluntarily or involuntarily.  These policy instruments include: laissez faire, moral suasion, 
regulation, incentives (or disincentives), and property rights allocations.  
 
Each policy instrument for addressing environmental externalities may be described by its 
components. For example, common fishery management options include regulations 
restricting use of specified gear and property rights specification for volume of fish landed. 
Clearly, the number of options is immense. Within categories there are many sub-options 
(e.g., types of gear that could be used, variations on incentive mechanisms), so the theoretical 
number of combinations of policy instruments and actions is very large. The approach 
described above is proposed as a mechanism for limiting to manageable dimensions the 
number of options receiving close scrutiny. 
 
The decision framework is depicted in Figure 1. 
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Perceived environmental problem with fishery 
Define type of fishery 
Carry out EIA – identify types of 
problems and evaluate significance 
Significant problem 
Not a 
significant 
problem 
Identify range of instruments potentially 
applicable to type(s) of problem(s) 
Assess likely instruments against 
range of evaluation criteria 
Select most likely 
instrument(s)
Implement and monitor within an adaptive 
management framework 
Environmental problems being 
avoided, remedied or mitigated 
Environmental 
problems not being 
adequately addressed 
Evaluate effectiveness of instruments against 
performance criteria 
Figure 1 
Preliminary Framework for the Decision Support System 
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Chapter 3 
Criteria for Selection of Management Tools for Marine 
Fisheries Externalities 
 
 
3.1 Rationale for Criteria 
 
Rational policymaking requires evaluation of expected outcomes against criteria to identify 
the implications of courses of action. Where multiple evaluative criteria exist there needs to 
be a process for trading-off outcomes across competing criteria in order to identify the 
preferred option.  A useful discussion of these approaches in a New Zealand context is 
provided by Strategic Policy Group (1995), although none of the five case studies deal with 
fisheries.  Nevertheless the basic principles of their work are included in the following 
discussion. 
 
Fishery management entails both strategic policy planning and operational planning aspects.  
Strategic policy takes a broader perspective than operational policy and consequently 
primarily addresses macro-level concerns.  Evaluative criteria developed from this arena 
typically occur at the national or fishery level.  In contrast, operational policy often has 
effects that are felt at the micro level and it can produce criteria quite different from strategic 
policy.  For example, a strategic policy might be to limit harvest to some specific level.  This 
may be achieved by an operational policy that restricts vessel size.  Fishers will be concerned 
about profitability, safety, location and logistic concerns of this policy that may have little or 
no importance at the strategic policy level.  Environmental policy spans both strategic and 
operational aspects of fisheries management and consequently criteria from both areas have 
relevance to the evaluation and selection of management tools. 
 
In an analysis aimed primarily at strategic fisheries policy, Anderson (1986 p.192) suggested 
that “a proper regulation regime should have the following characteristics: 
 
It should encourage innovation and research into new fishing methods. 
It should be flexible enough to allow for proper reaction to changes in economic and 
biological conditions. 
It should have the support of the majority of fishers involved. 
It must also take full cognisance of the costs of negotiations, research, and enforcement 
necessary to undertake the program; if these costs are not less than the benefits to be gained 
from regulating, the program cannot be justified. 
Finally, its effects on the distribution of wealth and on other management objectives such as 
maintaining employment, improving the balance of trade, etc., must be acceptable.” 
 
These criteria are equally applicable at the strategic and operational levels, but may be 
somewhat narrow.  Most early investigation of fisheries management was undertaken with 
the purpose of limiting harvest in order to protect target fish stocks and thereby protect 
harvests.  That would be appropriate if the only purpose of fishing were to catch fish.  This is 
not the case, people fish for a number of motivations, including income, recreation, lifestyle, 
cultural reasons, or food (Payne 1990).  Fisheries are also managed to enhance other societal 
objectives, including community structure and employment (Hannesson 1985).  These 
motivations suggest a role for socio-cultural analysis of fisheries management alongside 
traditional bio-economic approaches. 
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Environmental externalities associated with fishing require management to take an even 
broader view than this, however.  In particular, Section 9 of the Fisheries Act (1996) requires 
management decisions to take account of environmental principles, including: 
 
maintaining long term viability of species which are associated with or dependent upon the 
harvested species; 
maintaining biological diversity of the aquatic environment; and 
protecting habitats of particular significance to fisheries management. 
 
In addressing the need for other regulations to supplement an ITQ fishery management 
process, Anderson (1999) suggests the following strategy to identify which approach is best 
for management of environmental externalities in any particular context: 
 
Describe exactly the conservation problem that will not be addressed by a basic ITQ 
program. 
List possible ways in which the ITQ program can be modified so as to solve the problem. 
List possible supplemental regulations that will address the problems. 
Determine which of the potential solutions derived in Items 2 and 3 best addresses the 
problem and specify a modified ITQ program which incorporates these additional rules or 
procedures. 
Compare the basic ITQ program with the modified ITQ program to determine which one 
most adequately addresses the management objectives. If the modified one is judged superior, 
it should be adopted; if not, the basic program should be used (assuming that an ITQ program 
is to be used). The basic issue is to make sure that the modifications do not introduce 
problems worse than those they solve. 
 
In proposing the need for these supplementary policies, Anderson acknowledges that strategic 
policy (ITQs) does not necessarily address all operational concerns.  His strategy implies two 
major evaluative steps.  First, in step 4, is the requirement to determine which potential 
solution is “best”, and second (step 5) is the requirement to determine whether the best 
alternative is superior to the status quo.  The five evaluative criteria Anderson provided 
earlier are still relevant at this level, but do not address the full range of impacts that may 
arise. 
 
3.2 Criteria identification 
 
Criteria can be applied to assess the feasibility of management alternatives (implementation 
criteria) and the desirability of management alternatives (performance criteria).  Antunes and 
Santos (1999) categorise these criteria as: 
 
Implementation Criteria: 
Institutional setting, legal authority: there must be an institutional setting and legal 
framework to allow for the setting of a governance regime; 
Enforceability: related to the ability to enforce and monitor compliance; 
Public and stakeholders acceptance: the measures/instruments must be acceptable to the 
public and actors in the process; 
Technical and economical feasibility; 
Opportunity for action; 
Other institutional aspects: e.g., flexibility and compatibility with other sectoral/regional 
policies. 
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Performance Criteria: 
Economic efficiency: maximise the net benefit; 
Cost-effectiveness: maximise the benefit in a chosen indicator for a given expenditure or 
minimise the cost to attain a given objective; 
Environmental effectiveness: extent to which environmental objectives are met; 
Equity: refers to the allocation of gains and losses across the different agents, and in time and 
space. It is related to the perceived fairness of the policy; 
Response time: in some cases it is important to minimise the time needed to achieve the 
desired policy targets; 
Indirect effects: some measures/instruments aimed at an environmental problem can reduce 
(or increase) another one or create a new problem. 
 
Sapsford (1998) identifies desirable characteristics of biodiversity management instruments 
and provides several additional items to those proposed by Antunes and Santos (1999).  In 
particular, he notes that instruments should be: 
 
Robust: deliver relatively predictable results in situations of uncertainty about both 
biodiversity and changes in price, climate, etc; 
Precautionary: minimise the chance of serious irreversible consequences due to uncertainty; 
Flexible: able to be adapted to changing knowledge; 
Durable: create ongoing incentives for innovation towards [improvement] as technology, 
prices, climate, etc. change; 
Informative: encourages active self-monitoring and the dissemination of this information. 
 
While there is some overlap between the two sets of criteria, Sapsford (1998) adds the 
dimension of uncertainty (whether for biological, economic, or other reasons) and focuses on 
the need to be able to adapt to an uncertain future.  These needs are echoed in Section 10 of 
the Fisheries Act (1996), that describes information principles to be taken into account to 
address uncertainty. 
 
A different approach is adopted by Costanza et al. (1999), who identify the causes of oceanic 
environmental problems as the contravention of one or more of six “Lisbon principles of 
sustainable governance”.  The corollary of their argument is that proposed solutions can be 
evaluated according to whether they remove the violation(s) or introduce new violations.  The 
six principles are: 
 
Responsibility principle: Individual and corporate responsibilities and incentives should be 
aligned with each other and with social and ecological goals. 
Scale-matching principle: The appropriate scales of governance will be those which have the 
most relevant information, can respond quickly and efficiently, and are able to integrate 
across boundaries. 
Precautionary principle: In the face of uncertainty about potentially irreversible 
environmental impacts, decisions concerning the use of environmental resources should err 
on the side of caution. 
Adaptive management principle: Given that some level of uncertainty always exist in 
environmental resource management, decision makers should continuously gather and 
integrate appropriate ecological, social, and economic information with the goal of adaptive 
improvement. 
Full cost allocation principle: All of the internal and external costs and benefits of alternative 
decisions concerning the use of environmental resources should be identified and allocated. 
Participation principle: All stakeholders should be engaged in the formulation and 
implementation of decisions concerning environmental resources. 
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We consider these principles might be adopted as part of guidelines for using the Decision 
Support System that is the product of this project. 
 
The broad range of policy objectives influencing, and influenced by, fisheries management 
suggests that evaluative criteria for environmental externality management methods must be 
drawn from the social, economic, biological, cultural and legal arenas.  This perspective has 
been adopted by the New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries, as identified in the founding 
principles of its “Fisheries 2010” policy.  These principles, “help to minimise or resolve 
conflicts between environmental, economic and social objectives, and are already enshrined 
in environmental legislation such as the Resource Management and Fisheries Acts, in the 
Environment 2010 Strategy, and in international conventions.”   The twelve principles are: 
 
Inter-generational Equity 
Biodiversity 
Environmental Bottom Lines 
The Precautionary Principle 
Research, Science and Technology 
Protecting our International Competitiveness 
Sustainable Property Rights 
Least-cost Policy Tools 
Pricing of Infrastructure 
Internalisation of External Environmental Costs 
Defining the Limits of Fishery Resource Use and Substitution 
Social Costs and Benefits 
 
In addition, New Zealand has particular cultural concerns arising from the impacts of fishing 
on the environment because of the cultural significance of that environment to Mäori and the 
requirement to adhere to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
 
The criteria presented below are in five sections.  Criteria within each of the sections vary in 
terms of the strength of direction they give, i.e., the environmental and Treaty of Waitangi 
criteria are prescriptive because they are mandatory under existing legislation; economic and 
social criteria are less prescriptive because policy advisors and decision makers have greater 
latitude to consider these; management criteria fall in-between: in the main, they reflect 
attributes of good policy analysis.   
 
Within each category, for which criteria have been identified, both an overall generic 
criterion and specific criteria are listed (except Treaty of Waitangi for which only one 
criterion is identified). For general guidance purposes each generic overall criterion can be 
used as a coarse sieve of the range of instruments.  Recourse to the specific criteria will help 
identify particular strengths and weaknesses of the instrument(s).  
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Chapter 4 
Environmental Criteria 
 
 
The development of environmental criteria requires consideration of: 
 
Fisheries Act (1996) requirements 
Other relevant/associated NZ legislative requirements 
NZ’s international treaty obligations 
Government ‘resource management/environmental’ policy 
Industry self-management environmental principles. 
 
The Fisheries Act (1996) has been developed in an integrated way, reflecting many 
international commitments to sustainable fisheries management.  It draws on international 
conventions (e.g., UNCLOS Convention) and is complementary to related legislation (i.e., 
the RMA 1991) and policy (e.g., the Environment 2010 Strategy (MfE 1995)).  Because of 
this approach to development of the legislation, it has been possible to integrate more recent 
environmental management considerations into development of fisheries policy and its 
implementation.  Specifically, development of the Proposed Environmental Performance 
Indicators of the Marine Environment (MfE 1998) builds on key Fisheries Act requirements. 
 
As part of the implementation process of the Fisheries Act 1996, MFish is developing 
implementation guidelines for key sections of the Act1.  This work has been made available 
to us and is referred to, or adopted, where relevant.  Additionally, decision making under the 
Fisheries Act is principally based on Section 10, the Information Principles.  All of the 
criteria identified below need to be assessed in light of ‘best available information’ 
requirements (Auditor-General 1999) and a precautionary approach, as required under that 
section of the legislation. 
                                                 
1 PART II: PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES 
8. Purpose –  (1) the purpose of this Act is to provide for the utilisation of fisheries 
resources while ensuring sustainability. 
  (2) In this Act- 
      “Ensuring sustainability” means- 
(a) Maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to meet the reasonable foreseeable needs 
of future generations; and 
(b) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of fishing on the aquatic 
environment: 
“Utilisation” means conserving, using, enhancing, and developing fisheries resources to 
enable people to provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being. 
9. Environmental principles – All persons exercising or performing functions, duties, or powers under this 
Act, in relation to the utilisation of fisheries resources or ensuring sustainability, shall take into account the 
following environmental principles: 
(a) Associated or dependent species should be maintained above a level that ensures their long-term 
viability. 
(b) Biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be maintained. 
(c) Habitat of particular significance for fisheries management should be protected. 
10. Information principles – All persons exercising or performing functions, duties, or powers under this Act, 
in relation to the utilisation of fisheries resources or ensuring sustainability, shall take into account the following 
information principles: 
(a) Decisions should be based on the best available information: 
(b) Decision makers should consider any uncertainty in the information available in any case: 
(c) Decision makers should be cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable, or inadequate: 
The absence of, or any uncertainty in, any information should not be used as a reason for postponing or failing 
to take any measure to achieve the purpose of this Act. 
 20
The following environmental criteria are largely based on provisions of the Fisheries Act 
1996.  As a general principle all of the criteria below should be assessed/applied within the 
context and requirements of meeting international fisheries/UNCLOS obligations for which 
the New Zealand government is a signatory.  Another principle underlying development of 
these criteria concerns Section 8(2)(a) of the Fisheries Act 1996, i.e., ‘maintaining the 
potential of fisheries resources to meet the reasonable foreseeable needs of future 
generations’.  It is our view that the combination of criteria and their successful application 
takes into account the reasonable foreseeable needs of future generations. 
 
 
OVERALL ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERION:  
The Policy Instrument(s) safeguards the life supporting capacity of the marine environment 
in a healthy functioning state. 
SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA require that the policy instrument:  
avoid or minimise non-target fish bycatch, at least to the point where affected fisheries are 
maintained at viable levels; 
protects marine habitats, especially those on the seabed, from disturbance and damage that 
would compromise their ability to provide for dependent communities 
ensures fishing related mortality of marine mammals is below a maximum allowable fishing-
related mortality;  
ensures fishing related mortality of birdlife is below a maximum allowable fishing-related 
mortality;  
ensures fishing related mortality of invertebrates, flora and bryophytes is below a maximum 
allowable fishing-related mortality;  
minimises the effects of pollution on the marine environment including dependent ecological 
communities; and/or 
protects fish habitat generally. 
 
 
The criteria above are based on the following points, many of which are mandatory 
requirements of the Fisheries Act (1996). 
 
Environmental Principles 
Section 9 sets out the environmental principles that must be taken into account by all people 
making decisions or exercising powers under the Act in relation to the utilisation of fisheries 
resources or ensuring sustainability.  These principles are: 
 
 (a) Associated or dependent species should be maintained above a level that ensures their 
long-term viability: 
(b) Biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be maintained: 
(c) Habitat of particular significance for fisheries management should be protected. 
 
According to MFish (pers. comm./work in progress) the environmental principles should 
guide proactive fisheries management and research, including proposals for fisheries 
development.  They should also serve as a basis for guiding reviews of existing fishery 
management regimes. For example, the environmental principles should be used to guide: 
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The Minister’s decisions  
Priority decisions for fisheries research 
Development of fisheries plans 
Review of fisheries in the Adaptive Management Programme 
Proposals for development of new fisheries 
Continuous improvement in the management of existing fisheries. 
 
We consider they should also be used to guide the selection of instruments used to internalise 
the externalities from commercial fisheries management2. 
 
Principle  (a) Associated or dependent species should be maintained above a level that 
ensures their long-term viability. 
 
MFish (pers. comm. 2000) consider that the intent of section 9(a) is to provide a management 
strategy for those species that can not be commercially targeted, but which are actually 
affected by the taking of other species.  Non-harvested or associated or dependent species are 
those that are specifically prohibited from being targeted commercially. The species defined 
as being associated or dependent vary according to the commercial fishing regulations 
applying to each fisheries management area.  The exceptions are those species protected 
under the Wildlife and Marine Mammal Protection Acts, which cover all areas. 
 
Principle (b) Biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be maintained 
 
Biological diversity is defined in Section 2 of the Act as “the variability among living 
organisms, including diversity within species, between species, and of ecosystems”; and, 
“Aquatic environment”:  
Means the natural and biological resources comprising any aquatic ecosystem; and, 
Includes all aquatic life and the oceans, seas, coastal areas, inter-tidal areas, estuaries, rivers, 
lakes and other places where aquatic life exists.  
The principle that the biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be maintained is 
derived from the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992.  Biological diversity includes 
consideration of biodiversity at the level of ecosystems, species, and genes. 
 
The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy proposes a number of desired outcomes for marine 
biodiversity for 2020.  Briefly, these are: 
 
                                                 
2 MFish have identified the following principles that have guided the development of their proposed evaluative 
criteria:  
• Practicality and ease of use; 
• Consistency across each of the three environmental principles; and 
• Compatibility with the purpose of the Fisheries Act 1996. 
MFish propose the following evaluative criteria to determine the environmental effects of fishing for each of the 
three environmental principles:   
• What are the ‘ecological’ effects of fishing? 
• What is the likelihood of any positive or adverse ‘ecological’ effect (including cumulative effects)? 
• Are there any potential ‘ecological’ effects of high probability, or of low probability but with a high 
potential impact? 
• What could be done to avoid, remedy or mitigate any adverse ‘ecological’ effect? 
We do not consider these are criteria in the strict sense of the term, i.e., ‘a principle or standard that something 
can be judged by’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary). These proposed ‘criteria’ therefore need to be re-considered in 
terms of the aims and requirements of our research and also in line with the Proposed Environmental 
Performance Indicators of the Marine Environment (MfE 1998).  The most simple means of doing this is to ask 
the question: ‘Will the proposed policy instrument meet the requirements of section 9 of the Fisheries Act?’  To 
do this we need to explain section 9 and develop clear evaluative criteria. 
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natural marine habitats and ecosystems are maintained in a healthy functioning state 
a full range of marine habitats and ecosystems representative of indigenous biodiversity is 
protected 
there are no human induced extinctions of marine species 
marine biodiversity is appreciated, and any harvesting or marine development is done in an 
informed, controlled and ecologically sustainable manner. 
 
Actions in the NZ Biodiversity Strategy to support these goals include: 
 
integrating marine biodiversity protection priorities into programmes for sustainable fisheries 
use, such as fisheries plans, using an ecosystem approach 
identifying species and habitats sensitive to harvesting and put in place measures to avoid, 
remedy or mitigate adverse effects from commercial, recreational, and Mäori customary 
fishing activities 
using the precautionary principle when setting sustainability measures in the absence of 
information or where there is uncertainty 
integrating environmental impact assessment into fisheries decision-making processes 
avoid, remedy or mitigate the adverse impacts of human activities on marine biodiversity and 
develop habitat restoration programmes where appropriate 
achieve a target of protecting 10% of New  Zealand’s marine environment by 2010 with a 
view to establishing a network of representative protected marine areas 
protect and enhance marine species threatened with extinction. 
 
Because the NZ Biodiversity Strategy integrates legislative requirements amongst the range 
of extractive resource users it is proposed that internalisation mechanisms should address key 
aims of the strategy.   
 
Principle (c) Habitat of particular significance for fisheries management should be 
protected. 
 
MFish (pers. comm. 2000) notes the following: a useful starting point for defining habitat of 
particular significance for fisheries management is the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (USA).  This defines “essential fish habitat” to mean: 
“those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breeding, feeding or growth to 
maturity”.   
 
In general, habitat protection has not been included in traditional fisheries management, 
which has tended to focus on fishing activities.  However habitat is essential to healthy fish 
stocks. Pollution, freshwater influx, some fishing methods (e.g., dredging and trawling), and 
other human activities can degrade fish habitats.  The maintenance of healthy fish stocks 
requires the mitigation of these threats to fish habitat.  Effective management of significant 
fish habitats requires fisheries managers to collect information on those habitats and identify 
the factors that might pose risks to them.  
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Chapter 5 
Rights Guaranteed Under the Treaty of Waitangi: Treaty 
Rights Criteria 
 
 
The Treaty of Waitangi 1840 is the founding document of New Zealand as a nation. It is part 
of the law of New Zealand to the extent that it is incorporated into statute. A number of 
statutes relating to the marine environment incorporate reference to the principles of the 
Treaty and to the values and traditional relations of Mäori with natural places and resources.  
 
By the Treaty, the Crown confirmed and guaranteed the existing rights of tangata whenua to 
land and resources, including rights in respect of intangible taonga. For this reason, it is 
imperative that the choice of management tools to avoid, remedy or mitigate environmental 
externalities associated with commercial fisheries is assessed in terms of their implications 
for Mäori tribes, which have guaranteed to them under Article II the right to retain (and have 
restored to them if taken without consent) tribal resources and taonga, and the right to 
manage them according to their cultural preferences.  
 
TREATY OF WAITANGI CRITERION:  
The policy instrument(s) chosen will protect Mäori customary fishery rights and practices.  
 
Consideration and implementation of this criterion requires careful consideration of the 
potential effect(s) of an instrument on matters of tikanga and kaitiakitanga (see chapter 10). 
 
The Principles of the Treaty 
The recent changes to the legislation for management of the marine environment now make it 
mandatory for all responsible for administering these Acts to take into account the principles 
of the Treaty of Waitangi. Apart from the Fisheries Act 1996, these statutes include the 
Conservation Act 1987 and the Resource Management Act 1991.   
 
While these statutes refer to the principles of the Treaty, many iwi and hapu refer to the 
Treaty itself, and to the Mäori language document, rather than to broader “principles” or 
concepts more recently developed. Principles with particular references to the management of 
the marine environment, and relevant to evaluating management tools, are: 
 
The principle of partnership, incorporating the obligation on the Crown and tangata whenua 
to act in utmost good faith and to accord each other reasonable co-operation on major issues 
of common concern. This principle also obliges the Crown to consult, to ensure early and 
appropriate involvement of tangata whenua in order that decisions are based on adequate 
information. 
The principle of active protection of the Mäori interest, which involves more than passive 
recognition or consultation.   "…the duty of the Crown is not merely passive but extends to 
active protection of Mäori people in the use of their lands and waters to the fullest extent 
practicable”( Mäori Council v Attorney-General [1987] NZLR 664). 
 
It has been suggested that the principle of active protection also applies in regard to the 
natural resources and environment themselves: 
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“New Zealand has a heritage of indigenous species, in forests and wetlands, sea coasts and 
fisheries, held to be guaranteed as taonga by the Treaty of Waitangi. To remain taonga their 
prime requirement must be to exist…extinction is irreversible.” (Morton, 1995) 
 
and 
 
“…it can be maintained that Crown policies which have led to environmental degradation 
…are in themselves breaches of the Treaty.” (Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
the Environment, 1999, p. 67.) 
 
Principles identified by the Waitangi Tribunal include: 
 
The right to manage resources, places and other taonga according to tikanga and cultural and 
traditional values and methods. 
Recognition that taonga include tangible and intangible dimensions and values. 
 
Mäori Customary Fishery Rights  
Section 5 of the Fisheries Act 1996 stipulates that this Act should be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 
1992. The latter statute settled Mäori claims to commercial fisheries and confirmed in law 
Mäori customary fishery rights. These include the rights to harvest, monitor and manage 
traditional seafood resources. 
 
Section 12 of the Fisheries  Act 1996 makes provision for consultation with Mäori in regard 
to the setting of sustainability measures for fish stocks or areas. It also provides for the input 
and participation of tangata whenua having a non-commercial interest in a fishery or having 
an interest in the effects of fishing on the aquatic environment in the area concerned. This 
section also requires that particular regard is accorded to Kaitiakitanga. Thus, Section 12 
gives Tangata kaitiaki/tiaki a significant role in Ministry management processes, including 
providing comment on the activities of commercial and recreational fishers, which may affect 
Mäori customary fishing. 
 
Part IX of the Fisheries Act provides for taiapure and customary fishing. The object of 
providing for taiapure is to recognise rangatirantanga  and the right secured in relation to 
fisheries by Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi. Regulations have been enacted recently to 
manage customary fisheries. The powers and responsibilities of tangata kaitiaki/tiaki are set 
out in detail in these regulations.  
 
Further Clarification of Mäori Property Rights 
There are uncertainties about the full extent of Mäori rights to fisheries and the marine 
environment. These uncertainties relate to the separation of Mäori commercial development 
rights to fisheries from Mäori rights to customary or subsistence use of fisheries resources,  
rights to indigenous flora and fauna and the nature of property rights of tangata whenua  in 
natural resources  “as the common property of a people” as opposed to “the private property 
of individuals”, and the relationship of those rights to the public interest (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, op cit, p. 68). There are also unresolved claims and court 
actions relating to Mäori ownership of foreshore and seabed (pp. 68-69). 
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Chapter 6 
Socio-Economic Criteria 
 
 
There are four broad socio-economic requirements for assessment of the performance of 
policy instruments to address environmental externalities: 
 
Cost-effectiveness/least cost policy;  
Internalisation (full cost principle); 
Consideration of sudden changes in viability of fishing firms and fishing dependant 
communities; and 
The need to minimise transaction costs.  While transaction costs are dealt with in the 
discussion below, associated criteria are identified in the ‘management’ section (chapter 8). 
 
The following ‘overall’ and ‘specific’ criteria are designed to reflect these requirements: 
 
OVERALL SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRITERION:  
The Policy Instrument(s) provides the least cost way of achieving internalisation of the 
externality(s). 
SPECIFIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRITERIA require that the policy instrument: 
is the least net cost way for commercial fishers to achieve the desired environmental 
objective; 
forces the person causing the environmental externality to face all (or more) of the costs that 
they impose on the environment or on others; and/or 
avoids significant regional distributional effects. 
 
 
The following points explain the intent of these criteria.  While these paragraphs do not 
exactly match the criteria, in combination they do explain their general intent. 
 
Efficiency 
Efficiency is normally assessed using a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) framework. The CBA 
framework allows three main measures of policy impacts to be derived. These are net present 
value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR) and benefit/cost ratio (B/C). The latter measure is 
analogous to output/input ratio measures of efficiency in other disciplines. The three 
economic measures are intimately related, but which is preferred is generally determined by 
the nature of the problem being addressed. Investment opportunity choices, especially where 
there are many small competing and non-mutually exclusive opportunities, are generally best 
investigated using the IRR and B/C measures. The NPV measure is preferred where policy 
choices are mutually exclusive, a situation that would normally be expected to arise when 
choosing policies to address externalities. 
 
Profitability 
International competitiveness is a factor in industry profitability, which is also influenced by 
domestic factors. As profitability is the more general concern and is the issue of relevance to 
the industry, it will be the focus here3. Profitability is concerned only with market impacts 
and is therefore a narrower concept than efficiency.  Environmental (and other) policies 
should not award significant windfalls, nor impose wipeout losses on industry participants. 
                                                 
3 It is assumed that industry participants are not concerned about whether profits are derived from domestic or 
international sales. 
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Fisheries managers need to be sensitive to the likely impacts of proposed policies, and ensure 
that they do not have windfall or wipeout effects. 
 
Akroyd et al. (1999) describe how the price of quota can be used ex post to assess 
profitability of fishing for species under ITQ. However, evaluation of potential policies 
requires an ex ante measure of the impacts on profitability, sometimes for species that do not 
require ITQs. This task requires application of a cost benefit analysis framework applied from 
the industry perspective (rather than the social perspective). Analysis should be restricted to 
monetary revenues and costs incurred within the industry. 
 
Introduction of fisheries management policies can have significant effects on some 
communities that are heavily dependent on fishing for employment and income. The New 
Zealand Government acted precipitously in 1983 to remove part time fishers from the 
industry by declaring all fishers who received less than 80 percent of their income from 
fishing, to no longer be eligible to fish commercially (Memon and Cullen 1996). Selection of 
fisheries management policies in some instances must consider the impact on communities. 
 
Market power effects are important determinants of efficiency. However, the impacts of 
aggregation of market power are not always negative. For example, monopolisation of quota 
holdings (if that were possible) would provide optimal incentives for overcoming congestion 
externalities. It could also allow exploitation of economies of scale, where these exist. On the 
other hand, monopolisation of other services can skew relative prices and result in sub-
optimal resource allocation into and within the fishing industry. 
 
Internalisation 
Perfect markets require that every actor faces the full costs of their actions. This is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for free-market efficiency. Externalities arise in 
situations where actors do not face the true costs of their actions. Many environmental 
concerns arise in situations where people can use services of the natural environment for 
nothing, or below full cost, but where their actions force costs (or diminished benefits) on 
others.  It is often possible to achieve efficiency in the face of environmental externalities 
requiring internalisation. Approaches that do not internalise the externality result in gains to 
the externality-creating industry (relative to internalisation solutions) and may lead to strong 
pressures to expand the industry, or to avoid the regulations. Effective internalisation corrects 
these anomalies. 
  
Transaction costs 
Transaction costs are real costs of doing business. They entail the costs of obtaining 
knowledge, contracting, monitoring and enforcing agreements. Transaction costs can vary 
widely for different policy options. For example, it is much cheaper to monitor mesh size 
than to monitor effort. In some cases the transaction costs may be so high as to outweigh the 
benefits of policy implementation. It may be better, from an efficiency perspective, to live 
with the original problem. 
 
Dynamic Efficiency 
It may be possible to identify the best intervention to address environmental externalities 
now, but that solution may not remain optimal as changes occur in market conditions, 
technology or fishery ecology. Solutions based on achieving stated environmental outcomes 
(e.g. bycatch of less than x sea lions) have better dynamic efficiency than solutions that 
prescribe gear, fishing methods, or other operational parameters. The latter approaches reduce 
the incentive to design new gear, methods or operational procedures that could achieve the 
environmental objective while yielding larger profits from the industry. Where impacts 
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cannot be monitored, or enforcement is unlikely, then outcome-based policies may provide 
little or no incentive to innovate. 
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Chapter 7 
Recreational Criteria 
 
 
There is one major area for criteria development here: 
a. Maintain access to fish for recreationists. 
 
The suggested criteria are: 
 
OVERALL RECREATIONAL CRITERION:  
The Policy Instrument(s) will not have undesirable impacts on recreational fishers. 
SPECIFIC RECREATIONAL CRITERIA 
The policy instrument will protect access by recreational fishers to adequate fish stocks to 
satisfy their current and future needs. 
 
 
Recreational Fishing 
The rights of recreational fishers are different from those of commercial quota holders, and 
have not as yet been well defined. Compared to the QMS and the ITQ, and the recently 
established regulations for Mäori customary fishing, the recreational sector has no equivalent 
framework for precisely determining rights in the marine resource. For many New 
Zealanders, however, the freedom to go fishing is considered a birthright. It is imperative that 
tools to manage environmental externalities associated with commercial fisheries are 
evaluated in terms of how they may impact on access by recreational fishers to fishery 
resources. 
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Chapter 8 
Management Criteria 
 
 
Fisheries managers have limited resources available to achieve management objectives. They 
can be expected to search for internalisation instruments/mechanisms that can be 
implemented at moderate cost, are effective in achieving externality internalisation, including 
in less than optimal circumstances.  
 
OVERALL MANAGEMENT CRITERION:  
The Policy Instrument(s) is capable of being implemented within existing management 
constraints. 
 
SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT CRITERIA require that the policy instrument: 
is cheap to administer; 
does not require specific infrastructure that is not available at an acceptable price or in 
reasonable time; 
requires low levels of information about the state of the fishery, the activities of the fishing 
companies and the effectiveness of the internalisation instrument; 
does not make unacceptable demands upon the skill, capability, safety, and health of 
fisheries management staff; 
does not fail in non-ideal operating conditions; 
The policy instrument(s) is/are easily introduced;  
The policy instrument(s) is/are easily modified. 
 
 
Fisheries managers can consider the following ‘managerial’ factors when evaluating 
internalisation mechanisms. 
 
Administration Costs 
Answers to that question will be determined by the location of the fishery – inshore/mid 
water/deepwater; by the ease or difficulty in achieving compliance with the system; by the 
costs of monitoring fishing activities. Budgetary pressures will force fisheries managers to 
prefer low administration cost mechanisms. Is the internalisation instrument self funding? 
Some mechanisms have potential to be self-funding by requiring payment of fees by industry 
participants. This feature will increase their likelihood of acceptance by fisheries mangers. 
 
Specific Fisheries Management Infrastructure Requirements  
Some internalisation instruments may require that fisheries managers have specific items of 
equipment, e.g., for monitoring, or enforcement such as deepwater capability ships. Where 
these are not available to fisheries managers, alternative mechanisms must be selected to 
avoid the infrastructure requirement. A widely used alternative is to negotiate or require that 
fishing companies carry observers on board ships, or self report, to obviate the need for 
fisheries management vessels. 
 
Information Requirements 
Regulatory authorities often have poor information supply about those items and this can 
restrict their ability to successfully apply internalisation instruments. Where information 
availability is weak, fisheries managers will select internalisation instruments that make least 
information demands.  Section 10 of the Fisheries Act deals with the Information Principles – 
good practice guidelines can be used here. 
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Pressure on Fisheries Management Staff 
Some fisheries internalisation instruments require frontline staff to tackle risky tasks, or to 
deal with unpleasant situations. These pressures require specially trained fisheries 
management staff, payment of higher wage rates, and their overall effect is to increase costs 
of fisheries management. Internalisation instruments which do not lead to confrontation, do 
not require specially trained staff, or expose fisheries staff to risk, are likely to be more 
attractive to fisheries managers. 
 
How Well do the Internalisation Mechanisms Perform in Sub-Optimal Conditions?  
A first best internalisation instrument in optimal conditions may perform poorly in sub 
optimal conditions. Fisheries managers often operate in second best worlds of limited 
resources, poor information availability, variable causes of externalities, etc. Their preference 
may be for versatile internalisation instruments that operate satisfactorily in many situations, 
rather than a mechanism which only performs well in ideal conditions.  
 
Introduction and Modification 
Some fisheries policies require new legislation to introduce. Others can be introduced and 
varied by a change of regulations – a much simpler process. Managers who want to achieve 
speedy improvement in situations where externalities are present will favour instruments that 
can be readily introduced and varied. 
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Chapter 9 
Judging the Effectiveness of Instruments 
 
 
We have identified 7 types of fisheries: 
 
Trawl netting 
Seining 
Set netting 
Dredging 
Line fishing 
Pot fishing 
Diving. 
 
For each type of fishing there is a range of possible environmental impact classes: 
 
Bottom/sea bed disturbance 
Non-fish bycatch, which can in turn be subdivided into: marine mammals; birds; and 
invertebrates, flora, bryophytes, etc. 
Non-target fish bycatch 
Pollution. 
 
Combining these classifications provides the following matrix (Table 1): 
 
 
Table 1 
Areas of ‘Impact’ Associated with Type of Fishing Activity and Classification of 
Marine Impacts 
 
Impact classification 
Non-fish bycatch – 
Type of fishing 
activity Bottom/ sea 
bed 
disturbance 
Marine 
mammals 
Birds Invertebrates, 
flora, 
bryophytes, etc. 
Non-target 
fish 
bycatch 
Pollution 
• Trawl 
netting 
4 4 6 4 4 4 
• Seining 4 4 6 6 4 4 
• Set netting 6 4 4 6 4 4 
• Dredging 4 6 6 4 4 4 
• Line fishing 6 6 4 6 4 4 
• Pot fishing 6 6 6 6 4 4 
• Diving 6 6 6 4 6 4 
TOTAL 
POSSIBLE 
IMPACTS 
3 3 2 3 6 7 
KEY: 4 Fishing activity can cause a significant environmental impact 
 6 Fishing activity unlikely to cause a significant environmental impact 
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Analysis of the matrix indicates there is a total of 24 fishing activity-impact combinations.  
Each of these has a possible 22 (see appendix 1) internalisation instruments4 that can be 
applied to it.  Clearly, choice of best instrument can be viewed as an imposing exercise.  
However, for most types of fishing activities it is unlikely there will be more than 2 
potentially significant environmental impacts.  Consequently, the array of instruments to 
choose from may be much more manageable in these cases. 
 
Effectiveness can be predicted and can be evaluated ex post (see also Figure 1).  Both 
applications are required here.  The effectiveness criteria which follow are based on our 
judgements on what sustainable fisheries management requires in terms of ‘Avoiding, 
remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of fishing on the aquatic environment’ (Section 
8(b) of the Fisheries Act 1996). 
 
The range of criteria identified in preceding sections is summarised in Table 2 which also 
presents the criteria applied to measuring the effectiveness of each instrument in meeting 
these criteria. 
 
 
Table 2 
Evaluative Weightings Against Which Criteria Designed to Measure the Performance of 
Alternative Policy Instruments Can be Weighted 
 
POLICY 
AREA 
OVERALL 
CRITERION: 
SPECIFIC CRITERIA require that the 
policy instrument: 
WEIGHTINGS CRITERIA 
Environmental The Policy 
Instrument(s) 
safeguards the 
life supporting 
capacity of the 
marine 
environment in 
a healthy 
functioning 
state. 
• avoid or minimise non-target fish 
bycatch, at least to the point where 
affected fisheries are maintained at 
viable levels; 
• protects marine habitats, especially 
those on the seabed, from disturbance 
and damage that would compromise 
their ability to provide for dependent 
communities 
• ensures fishing related mortality of 
marine mammals is below a maximum 
allowable fishing-related mortality;  
• ensures fishing related mortality of 
birdlife is below a maximum allowable 
fishing-related mortality;  
• ensures fishing related mortality of 
invertebrates, flora and bryophytes is 
below a maximum allowable fishing-
related mortality;  
• minimises the effects of pollution on 
the marine environment including 
dependent ecological communities; 
and/or 
• protects fish habitat generally. 
4 = Highly effective in meeting the 
environmental criteria. Implies the instrument 
will largely resolve the problem caused by the 
externality.  
3= Moderately effective in meeting the 
environmental criteria. Implies the instrument 
will help resolve the problem caused by the 
externality, but may need to be used with 
another instrument.  
2 = Somewhat effective in meeting the 
environmental criteria. Implies the instrument 
might help resolve the problem caused by the 
externality, but will need to be used with 
another instrument.  
1= Largely ineffective in meeting the 
environmental criteria. Might be worth 
considering using in association with other 
instruments.  
0 = Totally ineffective 
-1 = Negative consequence 
-2 = Large negative consequence 
 
Treaty of 
Waitangi 
The policy 
instrument(s) 
chosen will 
protect Mäori 
customary 
fishery rights 
and practices. 
 4= Succeeds in protecting Mäori customary 
fishery rights and practice. 
0= Fails to protect Mäori customary fishery 
rights and practice. 
-1 = Negative consequence 
-2 = Large negative consequence 
 
                                                 
4 The 22 names of instruments we have listed are in many cases labels for a range of instruments, e.g., co-
management represents a spectrum of approaches, and charges can be lump sum taxes, taxes on inputs, taxes on 
catch, etc.  Hence the 22 instruments can be ‘unpacked’ into large listings.  Our scores of effectiveness in 
meeting criteria are therefore averages and must be considered in this context. 
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Socio-
Economic 
The Policy 
Instrument(s) 
provides the 
least cost way 
of achieving 
internalisation 
of the 
externality(s). 
• is the least net cost way for 
commercial fishers to achieve the 
desired environmental objective; 
• forces the person causing the 
environmental externality to face all 
(or more) of the costs that they impose 
on the environment or on others; 
and/or 
• avoids significant regional 
distributional effects. 
4 = Highly successful in meeting the socio-
economic criteria. Implies the instrument 
will: largely maintain the economic viability 
of the fishing industry and communities 
heavily dependent on the fishery; ensure that 
environmental costs are met by the firms who 
cause them; will not increase concentration 
ratio in the fishery. 
3= Moderately successful in meeting the 
socio-economic criteria. Implies the 
instrument will moderately increase costs, 
cause some reduction in profitability for 
firms, moderately reduce general prosperity 
in fishing dependant communities, or increase 
concentration ratios.  
2 = Somewhat successful in meeting the 
socio-economic criteria. Implies the 
instrument will significantly increase costs, 
reduce profitability of firms and prosperity of 
communities, or worsen concentration ratios.  
1= Largely unsuccessful in meeting the socio-
economic criteria. Implies the instrument will 
cause major increase in costs, greatly reduce 
profitability for firms, and general prosperity 
in fishing dependant communities, or much 
worse concentration ratios  
0 = Ineffectual 
-1 = Negative consequence 
-2 = Large negative consequence 
Recreational The Policy 
Instrument(s) 
will not have 
undesirable 
impacts on 
recreational 
fishers. 
• The policy instrument will protect 
access by recreational fishers to 
adequate fish stocks to satisfy their 
current and future needs. 
4= Maintaining recreational fishers' access to 
adequate fish stocks to meet their current 
needs. 
0 = Fails to maintain recreational fishers 
access to adequate fish stocks to meet their 
current needs. 
 
Management The Policy 
Instrument(s) is 
capable of being 
implemented 
within existing 
management 
constraints. 
• is cheap to administer; 
• does not require specific infrastructure 
that is not available at an acceptable 
price or in reasonable time; 
• requires low levels of information 
about the state of the fishery, the 
activities of the fishing companies and 
the effectiveness of the internalisation 
instrument; 
• does not make unacceptable demands 
upon the skill, capability, safety, and 
health of fisheries management staff; 
• does not fail in non-ideal operating 
conditions; 
• The policy instrument(s) is/are easily 
introduced  
• The policy instrument(s) is/are easily 
modified  
4 = Highly successful in meeting the 
management criteria. Implies the instrument 
will have low cost to introduce and 
administer. Requires little new information or 
specific infrastructure. Does or make unusual 
demands of fisheries management staff. 
3= Moderately successful in meeting the 
management criteria. Implies the instrument 
will have moderate cost to introduce and 
administer. May require moderate amount of 
new information or specific infrastructure or 
make some demands of fisheries management 
staff. 
2 = Somewhat successful in meeting the 
management criteria. Implies the instrument 
will have significant cost to introduce and 
administer. May require significant amount of 
new information or specific infrastructure or 
make significant demands of fisheries 
management staff.  
1= Largely unsuccessful in meeting the 
management criteria. Implies the instrument 
will have large cost to introduce and 
administer. May require large amount of new 
information or specific infrastructure or make 
large demands of fisheries management staff. 
0 = Totally ineffectual 
-1 = Negative consequence 
-2 = Large negative consequence 
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We have gone the next step of determining, in a preliminary way, the potential effectiveness 
of each instrument within one of the combinations concerned, i.e., trawling (see Table 3).  
However, our attempts at evaluating this potential are based on very limited information.  A 
defensible evaluation requires each instrument to be subjected to the same information 
requirements or principles (i.e., Section 10 of the Fisheries Act 1996).  An additional concern 
is the particular context within which the rating of effectiveness is made, e.g., institutional 
considerations.  Improvements, over time, of information should (re)inform the effectiveness 
rating.  Summing, by some means, the effectiveness across the likely range of applicable 
instruments provides us with a means of identifying those most likely to internalise and 
correct the externality. 
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Table 3 
Effectiveness of the Use of Internalisation Instruments Against Wide Ranging Criteria (scale 4= totally effective; -2 is negative) 
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No take zones 2 4 3 0 2 0 2 -2 2 3 0 2 4 4 4 4 4 1 3
Marine Reserve 2 4 2 0 2 0 2 -2 2 2 0 3 4 4 4 4 4 0 0
Temporary area closure 2 1 3 3 0 2 1 3 2 2 0 1 4 4 2 4 4 2 4
Closed seasons 2 1 4 3 0 2 0 -1 4 2 0 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 4
Size or sex selectivity 0 -2 -2 -2 -2 -1 0 4 2 3 0 3 2 4 4 4 1 4 4
Bycatch reduction devices 2 0 4 3 2 0 0 4 4 4 0 2 3 4 4 4 2 4 4
Technology ban 2 3 3 3 3 0 1 4 4 1 0 1 3 2 4 4 3 1 2
Input limitations (quantitative) 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 4 2 0 4 2 2 1 3 0 1 1
Catch limitations 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 3 2 2 0 2 2 4 3 4 3 1 1
Retention requirements 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 4 0 3 2
Tax variable inputs 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 4 4 1 3 1 1 1 0 2 0 2 0
Financial inducements 3 2 2 2 1 0 2 2 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 3 0 0 0
Subsidies 3 2 2 2 1 0 2 2 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 3 0 0 0
Environmental bonds 1 3 2 1 0 2 1 2 4 2 4 1 1 3 1 3 0 2 2
Property rights 3 2 3 1 1 0 4 0 2 3 4 3 3 2 0 2 0 2 0
Co-management 2 3 3 3 3 0 3 2 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 1 0 3 1
Codes of practice 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 4 4 1 4 4 2 2 4 2 4 4
Conservation easements 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 0 3 3 0 4 4 3 3 0 0 2 0
Tort law 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 4 2 2 4 1 4 0 0 0 0 0
Publications/guides 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 0 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 4
Informal regulation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 2 3 3 1 1 4 4 4
Accredited EMS 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 4 -2 4 2 0 4 3 4 4
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Chapter 10 
Overall Assessment and Guidance in Use of the Criteria 
 
 
The criteria identified above need to be prioritised/weighted to reflect the project 
requirements and the aims of the Fisheries Act 1996.  In the field of Environmental Impact 
Assessment, criteria are often: 
 
Differentially weighted; 
Subject to matrix analysis; 
Added, multiplied or subject to some other form of statistical treatment; 
Used in checklist form. 
 
It is our view that a combination of approaches is necessary here, i.e., 
 
(a)  Having completed an EIA and clearly defined the ‘type of fishery’ and its associated 
problem(s) then instruments can be chosen and subjected to evaluation under the 
Environmental Criteria which are accorded the top priority.  This is because the Fisheries Act 
concerns sustainable fisheries and sustainable fisheries are reliant upon successful 
achievement of section 9 of the Act.  Environmental criteria are also context specific, i.e., not 
all criteria need be met in every circumstance. 
 
(b)  Subject to environmental criteria being met then Treaty of Waitangi requirements 
should be considered next. 
 
(c)  Socio-Economic and recreational criteria are next in importance – e.g., if the 
instrument is ‘uneconomic’ then it is important to search for a more socially and 
economically appropriate instrument before considering recreational and management issues. 
 
(d)  Management criteria should be dealt with separately. 
 
Figure 2 shows the structure of how these considerations are prioritised.  In undertaking this 
evaluation ‘best practice’ guidelines will indicate a need for consultation and consideration of 
other relevant legislation, e.g., Commerce Act, Conservation Act and the Treaty of Waitangi.  
Such concerns are vital if, for example, an instrument is being considered, but its application 
potentially compromises Mäori tikanga or kaitiakitanga (also see chapter 5). 
 
It is our view that priorities will vary by context.  Policy analysts and others will choose 
different priorities according to changes in context. 
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Figure 2 
Hierarchical Framework for Considering Instruments Employed to Internalise 
Environmental Externalities 
 
 
The third and final part of our work, development of a Decision Support System and 
associated guidelines, will establish how this process can be operationalised. 
 
 
Spectrum of ESD based outcomes 
Ecosystem sustainability criteria 
Treaty of Waitangi 
i i
Socio-Economic 
i i
Instruments employed to internalise environmental externalities 
Management criteria filter
1st Order criteria 
2nd Order 
criteria 
3rd Order criteria 
Recreational
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Chapter 11  
Conclusions 
 
 
Potential instruments for internalising the externalities from commercial fishing were 
identified in Hughey et al. (2000).  We have now identified and developed a wide range of 
criteria that can be used to determine which policy instruments are best suited to resolving the 
environmental externalities.  The principal decision criteria are those based around section 9 
of the Fisheries Act, i.e., the Environmental Principles.  Assuming there are instruments that 
can achieve these criteria then further criteria representing Treaty of Waitangi, socio-
economic, recreational and management issues, need to be implemented.  A Decision Support 
System can now be developed to operationalise the process. 
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Appendix 1.  A Summary of the Instruments 
Instrument Main world uses Current NZ uses Applicability to  fishing 
Regulatory 
 
No take zones 
 
Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas etc – 
may target a specific 
species for protection 
Hoki spawning 
areas 
No fishing in specified zones 
means externalities not created 
Marine Reserves Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas etc 
protect habitat 
Banks Peninsula, 
Long Bay etc 
Area set aside for preservation 
of marine species 
Temporary area 
closure 
Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas, 
location of marine 
mammals, etc 
Hoki-squid 
interactions - 
implemented when  
critical thresholds 
exceeded 
No fishing during designated 
times and /or in prescribed 
areas. 
Closed seasons Protect closely 
associated/ 
dependant species 
Whitebait fishery 
generally to protect 
migration of certain 
species 
No fishing at certain times.  
Closely related to the above 
instrument. 
Size or sex 
selectivity 
Direct effort away 
from specified ages, 
sex individuals 
Rock lobster, size 
requirement 
Requirement for fishers to 
return to sea all prohibited catch 
Bycatch 
Reduction 
Devices (BRD) 
Reduce rate of  
bycatch of fish and 
other species 
Pingers for Hectors 
dolphins 
Vary technology used while 
fishing to reduce bycatch of fish 
or other species 
Technology ban Prevent externalities 
associated with 
specific harvesting 
technologies  
Drift netting ban Reduce bycatch by only 
allowing techniques which 
cause few externalities 
Input limitations Reduce externalities 
associated with 
number of potlifts, 
boat days etc 
Foveaux Strait 
oyster fishery 
Reduce volume of fishing 
activity and associated 
externalities 
Catch limitations Reduce externalities 
associated with effort 
Foveaux Strait 
oysters 
Limit total harvesting and 
associated externalities 
Retention and 
utilisation 
requirements 
Reduce dumping of 
target and non -target 
species 
CAAQ, FAAQ Allow non target catch to be 
landed, not dumped 
Financial systems 
 
Charges (Tax 
variable inputs) 
Provide incentive to 
reduce, eg, pollution 
Conservation 
Services Levy, 
applied to some 
non-fish bycatch 
Apply tax to variable inputs, 
boats, outputs, to reduce profits 
and externalities 
Financial 
inducements 
Bribe to behave in 
desired way 
??? Financial reward if do not create 
environmental externalities 
Subsidies Reduce costs of 
inputs 
R&D assistance Reduce costs of developing 
BRD 
Environmental 
performance 
bonds 
Provide financial 
incentive to avoid 
creating externalities  
Mining, 
biodiversity 
protection 
Provide incentive to not damage 
habitat or marine ecosystem 
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Rights based    
Property rights 
(IQ, ITQ, IVQ 
CDQ, Share 
fisheries) 
Reduce race to fish NZ QMS Creation of rights reduces need 
to race, provides incentive to 
maintain asset, so less 
externalities created 
Voluntary approaches 
 
Co management Right holders draw 
up operating systems 
Challenger Scallop Peer agreements reduce 
externalities 
Codes of practice Agreed behaviour 
which limits 
externalities  
HSNO, Agchem Industry develop, adopt, codes 
which limit or preclude 
externalities 
Accredited 
environmental 
management 
systems 
Industry develops 
systems - externally 
audited prior to 
accreditation 
Marine 
Stewardship 
Council, ISO 
14001 
Industry develop, adopt, 
systems with environmental 
policy which aims to limit or 
preclude externalities 
Conservation 
easements 
Negotiated 
agreements 
restricting a parties 
behaviour 
QEII Trust, Ducks 
Unlimited 
Negotiated agreement to not 
take certain actions eg create 
externalities 
Legal Remedies 
 
Tort law Liability for pollution 
damages 
RMA is a 'strict 
liability' law 
Potential damages claims 
provide incentive to avoid 
creating externalities 
Education Information supply 
 
Publications, 
guides, kits, etc 
numerous Numerous, e.g., 
biodiversity 
protection 
Informed people change 
behaviour, not create 
externalities 
Informal 
regulation e.g., 
environmental 
reporting 
Toxics Release 
Inventory and 
corporate 
environmental 
reporting 
??? Information release plus 
community pressure, modifies 
firm behaviour 
 
(Source: modified from Hughey et al 2000) 
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